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Introduction: Legal Regulation and the Juridification of Party Governance 
‘Modern organizations are immersed in a sea of law’.1 More specifically, the internal 
governance of voluntary organizations2 within civil society, such as political parties, 
advocacy groups or public benefit organizations is increasingly shaped by legal 
regulation. 3This development, in a sphere long considered as ‘private’, which crucially 
affects how citizens organize to jointly pursue their collective interests in the political 
sphere, can be interpreted as an indication of ‘juridification’: the proliferation of the law in 
formerly unregulated areas.4 A related development is the voluntary emulation of rule of 
law principles to regulate dispute resolution in spheres such as organizational governance 
where this is not legally required.5 This paper theorizes and empirically examines the 
relationship between these two conceptualizations of ‘juridification’6 with regard to political 
parties’ internal governance structures.7 
Internal divisions create strategic disadvantages for political organizations of all kinds 
keen to present themselves as effective representatives of their constituents’ interests, be 
this in agenda-setting, contesting elections or governing.8 Even more, the inability to 
manage severe conflict might threaten an organization’s survival. Political parties, for 
example, have expanded the power of their members in a range of areas.9 While widely 
considered as ‘legitimacy enhancing’, a powerful membership can encourage the active 
voicing of diverse opinions, which, in turn, can intensify internal conflict.10 Despite the 
growing importance of intra-organizational conflict regulation and a considerable literature 
– especially on parties – dealing with different sources of or arenas for internal conflict,11 we 
still know relatively little about the nature of the procedures that these organizations adopt 
to address this increasingly important challenge.12 Simultaneously, while a growing body of 
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research deals with the legal regulation of parties and groups,13 the consequences of such 
regulation for the juridification of organizational governance itself as reflected in an 
organization’s own rules and, more particularly, the intersection between the legally 
imposed and voluntary emulation of rule of law principles within organizational governance 
has not been systematically looked at.  
 To address this gap, we examine the legally imposed and the self-imposed 
‘juridification’ of regimes of conflict regulation within political parties – voluntary 
membership organisations central to the very functioning of democracy.14 We define 
‘conflict regulation regimes’ as the range of formal, intra-organizational rules and 
procedures used to manage, resolve or silence internal divisions to assure an organization’s 
on-going functioning.15 ‘Party juridification’, in turn, is defined as the replication of rule of 
law principles within intra-organizational procedures (e.g. norms of due process, such as the 
independence of tribunals, or rights to appeal).16  
We expect the extent of self-imposed juridification of party conflict regulation to be 
shaped by ideology, with leftist/progressive organizations exhibiting greater degrees of 
juridification owing to their relatively greater commitment to equality and equal treatment 
of members,17 equality assured by the emulation of rule of law principles in conflict 
regulation. We further theorize the implications of legally imposed juridification (when 
organizational governance is made subject to law) to examine whether organizations only 
meet the specific formal-legal requirements they have to comply with (coercive 
convergence) or they adopt conflict regulation structures that replicate legal standards 
underpinning the institutional setting they operate in beyond what is formally required by 
law (voluntary convergence). While the former reflects a materialist notion of the law as a 
system of rewards and penalties to which regulated actors respond strategically (and thus in 
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a minimalist fashion), the latter reflects a culturalist notion of the law instead as a ‘pervasive 
belief system’ finding reflection in organizational practices more widely.18 Contrasting the 
two notions in our study thus grants important insights in how deeply the expansion of 
formal-legal regulation affects organizational governance, visible in how parties respond to 
increasingly demanding legal environments when designing their own rules. 
 We test our theoretical expectations through a comparative analysis of conflict 
regulation regimes established in the statutes of 23 political parties that span the ideological 
spectrum, while operating in four European democracies with most different party laws 
(Germany, Norway, Spain and the UK). Our findings stress the importance of considering 
(ideologically shaped) self-imposed juridification of party conflict regulation in conjunction 
with legally imposed juridification to understand intra-party governance. More specifically, 
where organizational governance is subject to formal-legal regulation, the adoption of rule 
of law principles in party rules transcends formal-legal requirements, supporting the idea of 
voluntary convergence leading to a higher degree of juridification within parties than is 
legally required.  
 Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we specify our concept of the 
‘juridification’ of party conflict regulation and hypothesize, first, the role of the party’s 
ideological disposition and second, the role of external, formal-legal requirements in 
fostering either coercive or voluntary convergence in the juridification of political parties’ 
conflict regulation regimes. Having described our rationale for case selection, we present a 
new index of the juridification of party conflict regulation and its application to 23 state-
wide parties in the UK, Norway, Spain and Germany. We conclude by discussing the broader 




Theorizing Patterns of Party Juridification 
Building on broad notions of ‘juridification’ as ‘the penetration of law and legalism into 
domains previously governed by other forms of social ordering’,19 the juridification of party 
conflict regulation becomes manifest in the implementation of rule of law principles (e.g. 
equal access to the ‘courts’, the hearing of the conflicting interests, the impartiality of the 
‘judge’) within a party’s rules and procedures that assure the fair and equal treatment of the 
parties involved in a dispute.20 Ideally, imparting a quasi-legal foundation to intra-
organizational conflict regulation procedures (juridification) strikes a balance between the 
protection of organizational actors’ rights (be those held by elites or members) and the 
prevention of rights abuses by those actors to the detriment of the organization as a whole. 
The former is essential for any (formally allocated) rights to be freely and effectively 
exercised (‘voice’). In this sense, high levels of the ‘juridification’ of conflict regulation can 
underpin democratic decision-making structures in terms of inclusive member participation 
in those organizations that have adopted such structures and, under these conditions, can 
reinforce intra-organizational democracy.21 At the same time, the prevention of rights 
abuses damaging an organization (protecting the interests of the collective) – by elites or 
members – can require the officially sanctioned application of disciplinary measures 
(‘control’), which is important to the functioning of organizations, whether members have 
decision-making power or not. Generally, the juridification of organizational governance 
(whether self- or legally imposed) places restrictions on how and by whom such ‘control’ 
can be exercised. Consequently, a high degree of juridification has important functional 
implications for all membership organizations including parties. When assuring a fair and 
equal treatment by party tribunals, these procedures can enhance legitimacy by protecting 
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the ‘voice’ of those who do not hold privileged positions in the organization (thus are 
usually in a weaker position when it comes to internal conflict and often have no say in the 
use of intra-organizational sanctions and do not necessarily have a say in in internal 
decision-making). Simultaneously, they curtail elites’22 capacity to manage and, thereby, 
contain conflict quickly (e.g. by the application of sanctions), potentially weakening the 
organization as a whole. This is why the nature of procedures for intra-party conflict 
regulation are not only important but also contentious.  
 
This is not to say that formal intra-party rules such as those constituting conflict regulation 
regimes cannot be circumvented or manipulated by those in charge, as the on-going and 
unresolved debate around the actual consequences of intra-party reforms broadening 
members’ rights in areas such as candidate or leadership selection highlights.23 What we do, 
however, argue is that the formal rules parties give themselves – once in place – constrain 
elites and shape internal dynamics in various ways, as echoed by recent case studies on how 
conflict regulation procedures operate in practice.24 For example, for members to 
commence legal action against their organization for violating its own rules, and for the 
courts to get involved in intra-party life, does not require these rules’ underpinning by 
specific party laws25 as recently experienced by UK Labour in a conflict over its leadership 
election rules that attracted extensive media scrutiny. When conflict remains ‘contained’ 
and is completely managed within the organization, formally granted rights and protections 
can be used by dissenters to insist in being heard, whether party governance has remained 
– in legal terms – ‘private’ or not. This is also the case because intra-party conflict and how 
parties deal with it attracts considerable media attention. It is one indication of parties’ 
attitudes towards ‘pluralism’, whose simple repression is increasingly deemed unacceptable, 
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preventing party elites from simply prioritizing ‘control’, not only but especially when party 
rules require otherwise.  
Ideological Dispositions and Self-imposed Juridification 
Given its contentiousness, we expect party juridification to be affected by the ideological 
disposition of the organization that shapes whether it prioritizes the protection of 
membership rights (suggesting high juridification of conflict regulation procedures) or 
enhances elite control to protect organizational integrity and assure its functioning 
(suggesting low juridification). Research on parties as well as on social movements has 
shown that left-leaning parties (e.g. green, left-libertarian and social democratic) 
organizations holding anti-authoritarian and emancipatory values are more likely to 
emphasize democratic principles in their rules, whereas right-leaning organizations that 
embrace conservative or authoritarian values are less likely to do so.26 Similarly, left-leaning 
parties and movements hold strong notions of member equality.27 We therefore expect 
those parties to be particularly inclined to reproduce legal norms protecting members’ 
rights (including fair and equal treatment in conflict situations), and hence, to adopt legal 
standards within conflict regulation procedures. Everything else being equal, right-leaning 
organizations are expected to prioritize control instead, which suggests lower juridification 
of conflict regulation in political parties that will be visible in fewer protections for intra-
party actors involved in conflict situations and more leeway for the application of top-down 
sanctions.  
 
H1 (Ideological Disposition Hypothesis). Ceteris paribus, left-leaning political parties display 




Party Juridification through Formal-Legal Constraints - Coercive or Voluntary 
Convergence? 
While the diversity of ideologies leads us to expect diversity in party conflict regulation 
(showing in different levels of intra-organizational juridification), organizations’ exposure to 
the same legal environment can create pressure to adopt similar intra-organizational 
procedures instead, thereby leading to the convergence of conflict regulation regimes.28 
While it is widely accepted that legal environments influence organizations in their 
operations, the nature of this influence still constitutes an important puzzle. Edelman and 
Suchman distinguish two perspectives on how the law affects organizations (voluntary and 
others), a materialist and a culturalist one,29 through which we can theorize the 
consequences of (externally imposed) juridification defined as the proliferation of the law in 
formerly unregulated areas.30 In our case, this refers to intra-organizational governance 
(party juridification).  
The first perspective conceptualizes legal regulation as a system of concrete rewards 
and penalties imposed on organizations to alter their behaviour, with organizations making 
calculated decisions to avoid the law’s costs and profit from its benefits.31 Culturalists, 
however, see the law as a ‘pervasive belief system’ – one that legitimates organizational 
forms and shapes their internal norms accordingly. Consequently, while the materialist 
perspective expects actors to evade the constraints of the law as far as possible, the 
culturalist perspective expects them to adopt structures and practices because the socio-
legal environment presents them as responsible and legitimate without this being formally 
imposed.32 This distinction suggests two contrasting hypotheses regarding what patterns of 
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organizational convergence (associated with different levels of juridification) to expect once 
organizations face formal-legal constraints.  
 Starting with the material perspective and considering organizations that operate in 
a legal environment that treats organizations’ internal operations as a private matter, 
conflict regulation regimes should be shaped by organizations’ values and ideologies, even if 
these contrast strikingly with the norms underpinning the organizations’ legal environment. 
We should find that regimes of conflict regulation are only similar (assuming organizations 
hold different preferences regarding how to balance ‘voice’ and ‘control’) in the particular 
elements that legal regulation explicitly prescribes. Even in a highly regulated democratic 
state we should find some diversity as not every aspect of conflict regulation regimes is 
likely to be pre-defined by law, leaving leeway to organizations to implement their own 
solutions, which – following the materialist perspective – they are expected to exploit.  
 
H2.1 (Coercive Convergence Hypothesis): Once organizational governance is made subject to 
formal-legal regulation, conflict regulation regimes within organizations converge in the 
regulated areas in line with formal-legal requirements.  
 
Theorizing the consequences of legal regulation from a culturalist perspective instead, once 
formal-legal provisions explicitly target organizations’ internal processes, central principles 
incorporated and represented by the socio-legal environment in the longer term become a 
relevant point of reference for organizations to legitimize themselves. This can include 
elements of how the (state) legal system protects citizens’ rights and assures due process, 
which organizations can be expected to emulate to present themselves as responsible and 
legitimate,33 suggesting a process of voluntary rather than coercive convergence. If so (and 
given that legal requirements are sufficiently stable to become a ‘normative’ reference point 
in organizations’ environment), the resulting inter-organizational similarities of conflict 
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regulation procedures should go beyond those aspects of conflict regulation imposed by the 
law. That is, in the case of voluntary convergence juridification as response to formal-legal 
constraints should be more pronounced than expected under coercive convergence. 
 
H2.2 (Voluntary Convergence Hypothesis): Once organizational governance is made subject 
to formal-legal regulation, conflict regulation regimes within organizations converge in the 
regulated areas, transcending formal-legal requirements.  
 
While the following empirical analysis of the juridification of party conflict regulation 
procedures will focus – in line with our hypotheses – on the role of parties’ ideological 
dispositions and their exposure and response to formal-legal constraints, it will consider a 
range of systemic and party-level factors that, based on existing research, could be expected 
to affect the nature of party regulation on the one hand and the potential for conflict in an 
organization (which might in turn affect conflict regulation procedures) on the other. On the 
system level, we will consider the implications of democratic age and an authoritarian past 
for party law provisions as new democracies, especially those with an authoritarian past, 
have been associated with the adoption of extensive party regulation as a safeguard for the 
newly established democratic regime. On the party level, we will consider party size as a 
proxy for intra-organizational heterogeneity as well as newness in the parliamentary arena 
and participation in government, two constellations that generate new lines of conflicts 
within a party organization but also intensify media attention and, with it, pressures on the 
organizations to act in a unified manner requiring effective conflict regulation procedures.34 
 
Case Selection and Data 
Selecting ‘Most Different’ Legal Environments 
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For our hypotheses to be applicable, organizations need to operate in consolidated 
democracies where the rule of law is well established and, once passed, laws are enforced.35 
Only under these conditions can legally-induced convergence be expected, especially the 
voluntary form which presupposes that laws are not only relevant in the form of specific 
‘imposed’ constraints on actors’ autonomy, but represent broader norms that are embraced 
by the society they regulate.36 The UK, Norway, Germany and Spain meet this basic scope 
condition, while varying the formal-legal constraints on party governance, thereby 
constituting a most different set of cases.37 All four countries have a ‘party law’ (a single 
legal document bringing together rules applying specifically to parties),38 while covering the 
range of constraints on intra-organizational governance embedded in such laws.39 The 
German and Spanish party laws regulate how party conflicts ought to be addressed (see 
details below), the party laws in UK and Norway do not contain any legal provisions targeting 
organizational governance.40 The four countries also represent different legal systems 
(Common law, Nordic, Germanic and Napoleonic)41 assuring that difference between the 
two ‘pairs’ cannot be accounted for by differences in legal tradition. 
Consequently, in the UK and Norway, parties’ internal life has remained – as that of 
other associations – a private matter.42 In line with H1, we should find considerable 
differences in the juridification of conflict regulation between parties within and across the 
two settings, reflecting parties’ own ideological dispositions. To examine our two 
‘convergence hypotheses’ (H2.1/2), Germany and Spain have party laws regulating intra-
organizational matters, taking parties’ internal life from the private to the public realm,43 
and making conflict regulation subject to a set of ‘objective’ legal constraints and (potential) 




 Table 1 identifies the legal provisions requiring the juridification of party conflict 
regulation in each democracy (column 4).44 Identifying these constraints is essential in 
evaluating whether – if we find similarities in conflict regulation procedures across parties in 
a country – they are the result of legally imposed constraints or a voluntary response to 
‘normative’ pressures. 
 
- Table 1 about here  -  
 
 
Considering the differences in the formal-legal constraints established in German and 
Spanish party law (Table 1), the former prescribes eight characteristics of conflict regulation 
regimes, the latter only four, reflecting the much more liberal character of the Spanish party 
law, which unlike the German law leaves parties wider leeway to regulate their internal 
matters (despite the historical influence of the latter on the former).45 If parties only comply 
with provisions they have to (and otherwise follow their ideological orientations) (H2.1 
Coercive Convergence Hypothesis), we should find considerably more pronounced inter-
party differences in Spain than Germany. Simultaneously, party juridification should vary 
less in both of these two settings than in the UK and Norway where parties’ intra-
organizational matters are unconstrained by the law. If, however, German and Spanish 
parties have instead voluntarily emulated legal norms because their intra-organizational 
processes are subject to external formal-legal constraints making the norms underpinning 
the state legal system a central normative reference point (H2.2 Voluntary Convergence 
Hypothesis), parties should emulate such norms despite them holding conflicting ideologies 
(as in others it could be simply an expression of their ideological preferences). This, in turn, 
would suggest that differences in party juridification between Germany and Spain driven by 
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ideology should be only minor, with only the UK and Norway showing significant inter-party 
variance in line with our H1 Ideological Disposition Hypothesis.  
 
Party Cases and their Statutes 
To evaluate our three hypotheses, we examine the emulation of legal norms within party 
conflict regulation procedures as laid out in national party statutes of all state-wide parties 
with (national) parliamentary representation in 2015-2017, which provides us with a range 
of left- and right-leaning parties across all four party systems, using the most recently 
passed statutes. Studying formal party rules is important and appropriate for an assessment 
of juridification because they are ‘the legal heart’ of a party organization.46 They are 
articulated in public documents that tell the ‘official story’ of a party, and codify the intra-
party processes that provide the formal basis for conflict resolution mechanisms that can be 
utilized by members and elites (see also our discussion of the constraints formal rules 
impose on party practices earlier). They provide evidence of the two different dimensions of 
juridification (externally imposed and voluntary) in that they represent conscious and 
calculated responses to both social expectations47 and the day-to-day challenges faced by a 
party organization.48 Hence, the focus on state-wide parties assures comparability as the 
parties covered are exposed to similar types of conflicts: ‘horizontal’ conflicts within and 
across party organs inside and outside public institutions and ‘vertical’ conflicts between 
national units and subnational branches.49 To avoid problems of reverse causation (party 
laws being modeled based on organizational rules) we exclude the three government 
parties (CDU, SPD and PP) that drafted the German and Spanish party laws in the first 
place.50 This leaves us with a sample of 23 parties, each country sub-sample containing an 




Measuring the Juridification of Intra-Party Conflict Regulation Regimes  
To capture degrees of intra-organizational juridification we follow Agrast et al. who 
characterize the rule of law as a rules-based system in which (1) the government and its 
officials and agents (decision-makers) are accountable under the law; (2) the laws are clear, 
publicized, stable, and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons 
and property; (3) access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical 
adjudicators, attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient 
number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve; 
and (4) the process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, 
fair, and efficient.52 Building on this specification, we operationalize core components that 
contribute to the juridification of conflict regulation inside an organization. Table 2 lists the 
indicators constructed, which of the four components in the definition they are derived 
from, and rationalizes the weighting of indicators in the final index based on the relative 
importance of the component. The Online Appendix provides a more detailed version of 
Table 2 (Table A3) with specifications of the coding categories and Table A4 provides coding 
examples for each indicator. 
 
- Table 2 about here -  
 
 
Each indicator reflects one or several of the four components in the Agrast et al. 
specification.53 Indicators are weighted according to whether they capture the realization of 
fundamental principles necessary to meet the basic standards of rule of law (components 1 
and 2) or whether they support its fair and effective implementation (components 3 and 4).54 
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Importantly, a party does not meet basic rule of law standards if party officials are formally 
authorized to change any provision on conflict regulation whenever dealing with a new 
case, making conflict regulation arbitrary, a process neither clear nor stable to the parties 
involved (component 2). This is also the case when party officials in charge of the 
organization cannot be held accountable due to restricted access (component 1) given when 
conflict regulation deals exclusively with disciplining members and units without providing 
an avenue to bring forward other cases of non-compliance, including the grievances of 
members against other members or party elites.55 In such scenarios, the presence of 
procedural measures such as independent tribunals is unlikely to assure due process. In 
other words, the weighting suggests that a conflict regulation regime has a higher level of 
juridification when regulating the full range of conflicts (e.g. member behaviour damaging 
the organization as well as party officials abusing their power or violating the rights of rank-
and-file) (component 1) but has weak enforcement (component 4), compared to the 
opposite configuration, a regime that is devised to only allow officials to discipline members 
and is strongly enforced.  This is why components 1 and 2 are weighted most heavily in the 
final index (1.5). Central procedural features assuring that ‘judges’ are independent and fair 
in their decision-making such as the independence of the tribunal and possibilities for 
appeal (component 3) are weighted 1, while features assuring efficient enforcement 
(component 4) are weighted 0.5. Based on that logic, juridification raw scores can range 
from 0 to 10. The final scores are standardized from zero to one. Figure A1 in the Online 
Appendix shows the spread of indicators across parties and countries stressing the wider 




Findings: The Emulation of Legal Standards in Political Parties – Coercive or Voluntary 
Convergence?  
Figure 1 shows the juridification scores for all parties analyzed, country by country, 
identifying parties in each party system as either left- or right-leaning based on the ‘general 
left-right position’ provided by the Chapel Hill expert survey.56  To examine Hypothesis 1, 
the ranking of parties is less relevant than the location of each party in either the left or 
right ‘bloc’, which is indicated in Figure 2 by the ‘demarcation line’ at the mid-point of each 
party system (point 5 of 10-point left-right scale provided by Chapel Hill).  
To start with an overall observation, parties’ juridification scores are much more 
diverse within Norway and the UK, two settings without ‘statutory’ interference into intra-
party life, than within Germany and Spain, two settings where intra-organizational 
governance is subject to statutory regulation (see also Figure 2 below). This is in line with 
our Ideological Disposition Hypothesis as in the UK and Norway (in the absence of formal-
legal constraints) we find juridification scores in line with parties’ ideological orientation (in 
turn leading to higher internal diversity): left-leaning parties are more prone to juridification 
than right-leaning parties. More specifically, in the UK the two parties on the right, the 
Conservatives and UKIP, have the lowest scores (0.2 and 0.35 respectively). On the left, the 
Green Party and Liberal Democrats have the highest scores with 0.8, followed by Labour 
with 0.7. Thus, the UK parties on the left are clearly more inclined towards juridification 
than parties on the right. The Green Party, reflecting a particularly strong commitment to 
intra-party democracy,57 has the highest score, together with the Liberal Democrats, 
another organization with a culture of participation among party members.58 In Norway, 
discrepancies between parties in terms of juridification are more pronounced than in the 
other three party systems and - overall - match ideological patterns, thereby substantiating 
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our Ideological Disposition Hypothesis: the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party – both 
right-leaning parties – have the lowest juridification with no provisions replicating legal 
norms in their statutes (and hence have zero scores), followed by the Conservative Party 
with a score of 0.15, also on the right. All parties in the left bloc have higher scores than the 
latter, notably the Greens with a juridification score of 0.65 and Labour with a score of 0.55, 
both parties with strong commitments to member equality. That said, we find the highest 
score of 0.7 in the right-wing Progress Party,  contradicting the overall pattern. Two factors 
have contributed to this: first, the party used Labour as its template for organization-
building rather than a party in its ‘own’ bloc59 and, second, suffered from intense 
organizational conflict addressed by centralizing reforms.60 The latter, in turn, generated a 
greater need to specify requirements and rights for the parties involved in its conflict 
regulation procedures than faced by other parties. While the methodological implications of 
this finding needs to be assessed through future research (see on this the conclusion below),  
parties on the left have – on average - higher levels of juridification than parties on the right, 
both in Norway and the UK, suggesting that conflict regulation procedures in the UK and 
Norway reflect intra-party values. This is also substantiated by a Welch’s t-test which 
confirms that there is a significant difference between the levels of juridification of left-
leaning parties and right-leaning parties in these two countries (t(9.87)=-2.52, p=0.01). 
In contrast, in Germany and Spain (where parties are exposed to formal-legal 
constraints), party juridification scores are not only generally higher than in the UK and 
Norway, they are not in line with parties’ ideological dispositions either. In fact, left-leaning 
parties in Spain such as EQUO and IU present the same juridification scores than right-
leaning parties such as Ciudadanos and UPyD. Further, that right-leaning Spanish parties 
have higher juridification scores than some left-leaning parties, such as PSOE or Podemos, 
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suggests that ideological dispositions are no major driver of juridification once party law 
regulates intra-organizational matters. In Germany, all parties present the same level of 
juridification with a score of 0.95, despite vastly different ideological profiles. As in Spain, 
German parties’ ideological dispositions are not driving party juridification. Hence, unlike in 
Norway and the UK, there is no significant difference between the level of juridification for 
left-leaning parties and right-leaning parties in Spain and Germany, as again indicated by a 
Welch’s t-test (t(6.33)=1.52, p=0.91).  
Figure 1 here 
 
Moving to our contrasting hypotheses on coercive and voluntary convergence as alternative 
responses to formal-legal requirements, Figure 1 highlights that, in both Germany and 
Spain, parties have adopted relatively similar levels of juridification. To distinguish coercive 
from voluntary convergence as a response to formal-legal obligations in each of the two 
systems, it is important to go back to which indicators measured in our party juridification 
index were legally required by the German and Spanish party laws respectively (see Table 1 
for the relevant legal provisions). Essentially, under Spanish party law the benchmark for 
voluntary convergence is lower as it requires parties to only meet four basic requirements 
considered in our index: the right to appeal, members’ access to conflict regulation 
procedures, procedures encompassing both sanctions and challenge of rule violations, and 
the right to be heard before a decision is taken. In contrast, the benchmark in Germany is 
much higher: German party law specifies requirements in all ten areas covered in the index, 
with the exception of one of the enforcement indicators - the requirement to provide an 
outcome in a predefined period (note, however, there is still leeway in how strictly parties 
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implement requirements, as the law does not necessarily prescribe the ‘highest score’ 
assigned to each indicator in our juridification index).  
Keeping in mind that coercive and voluntary convergence can only be assessed system by 
system, Figure 2 shows the average and standard deviation of the party juridification index 
in each of the countries analyzed. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
In Spain, the average level of juridification is 0.8 with a standard deviation of 0.07, showing 
very low inter-party variation and illustrating convergence in the levels of juridification 
among the different parties. If the convergence of legal requirements was coercive (that is, 
directed exclusively towards the implementation of specific formal-legal constraints), 
juridification in Spain should not be much higher than 0.45, the score corresponding to the 
level of party juridification formally required by the party law. However, this is not what we 
find: the results show a much higher score of juridification in all Spanish parties (scores 
range from 0.7 to 0.85), going clearly beyond what is legally required and substantiating our 
Voluntary Convergence Hypothesis (H2.2). Aspects of juridification not prescribed by the law 
but nonetheless adopted by all or most of the Spanish parties include, for instance, the 
establishment of a timeframe for decision-making and the requirement of an appeal body.  
In Germany, where – compared to Spain – more than twice as many legal 
requirements related to juridification are in place, we find that all parties have the same 
juridification score (0.95). If convergence to legal requirements was coercive the score of 
the party juridification index should be 0.85 (again the score corresponding to legal 
requirements) but that is not the case. This suggests that also in Germany parties have 
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transcended formal-legal requirements in line with our Voluntary Convergence Hypothesis 
(H2.2). For instance, all parties but the FDP, include provisions in their statutes that require 
decisions to be made in a predefined time frame, which is not prescribed by the law. Our 
results thus suggest that, once party governance is legally regulated, parties emulate norms 
underpinning the state legal system above and beyond what is legally required, as visible in 
the juridification of their conflict regulation regimes.  
 
Concluding with alternative explanations, the cross-country variation in the levels of 
juridification among EU member and non-member states as well as old and new 
democracies61 suggests that neither of them shape juridification patterns. Previous research 
suggests that an authoritarian past incentivizes the adoption of extensive party regulation as 
a safeguard for the newly established democratic regime.62 However, not all countries with 
an authoritarian past regulate intra-organizational matters.63 More to the point, while we 
find (as a response to party laws) higher juridification levels in Germany and Spain (both of 
which have an authoritarian past), the presence of parties with high juridification scores in 
all four countries analyzed suggests that such experience is not a necessary condition for 
juridification. Similarly, party-level factors (other than ideology) such as party size, newness 
in parliament and participation in national government cut across the party juridification 
patterns found in our analysis.64 Major parties tend to be internally more heterogeneous, 
potentially inviting more internal conflict. However, there is no significant relationship 
between major vs. minor party status and juridification level (Welch’s test (t(10.93)=-1.07, 
p=0.31)). Furthermore, being new in the national parliamentary arena tends to put parties 
under considerable strain.65 They are for the first time confronted with the pressure to 
function in public office and to reconcile tensions between those pressures and demands of 
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the extra-parliamentary organization, while being exposed to enhanced media attention. 
However, parliamenetary newcomers with no more than two terms experience do not have 
signigicantly higher levels of juridification (Welch’s test (t(18.98)=-1.59,p=0.06). Similarly, 
research has indicated that participation in government enhances divides within parties, 
while putting them under greater pressure to assure internal cohesion, making effective 
conflict regulation regimes paramount.66 Our results, however, do not show significant 





In a broader climate of disaffection with traditional political institutions, voluntary 
organisations, including political parties, face significant challenges to their organizational 
integrity and legitimacy.67 Meanwhile, as parties face increasing regulation from the state – 
particularly in areas once considered their ‘private’ affairs,68 they must find a way to 
maintain organizational discipline whilst accommodating intra-organizational diversity. 
Reconciling these tensions is no easy task. While strengthening and enforcing members’ 
rights might enhance organizational legitimacy, it also comes at the cost of effectively 
managing internal conflict.69 Consequently, voluntary convergence has important 
implications for the everyday management of diversity and cohesion within membership 
organizations, fundamental to their sustainability and survival. This is all the more significant 
if party members increasingly go to court to overturn unwelcome internal decisions. This 
can not only be done on grounds of parties violating external legal requirements but 
depending on the legal system also when parties violate their own rules.70 Thus, even when 
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parties emulate legal standards in their statutes voluntarily, they open the door for more 
state involvement 
 
Utilizing the concept of juridification,71 we suggested that organizations’ responses to this 
tension within their conflict regulation regimes are shaped by two factors: their ideological 
disposition and the external legal environment in which they operate. In line with our 
theoretical expectations, our findings suggest that in legal environments where parties are 
free to structure themselves according to their own beliefs and priorities (as in the UK and 
Norway), organizations do indeed meet the challenges related to conflict regulation in 
different ways reflecting basic ideological dispositions. Where the internal life of parties is 
targeted by the law (as in Spain and Germany), conflict regulation procedures are much less 
reflective of the ideological disposition of parties. Instead, they show a pattern of voluntary 
convergence. Rather than simply comply with the minimum required by the law (coercive 
convergence), ideologically diverse parties adopt similar intra-organizational rules echoing 
the standards underpinning the state legal system, thereby assimilating beyond what is 
legally necessary (voluntary convergence).  
The support we found for our voluntary convergence hypothesis has important 
implications for how we think about the impact of the external legal environment on 
internal organizational structures and processes. Our research suggests that the legal 
environment in which parties operate has a much broader effect than simply imposing 
‘objective’ constraints, but functions as a ‘pervasive belief system’ that legitimates 
organizational forms and shapes their internal norms.72  This is likely to affect other areas of 
internal governance such as party finances. Transparency of party funding, for instance, is 
increasingly required by law73 as reflection of broader attempts to enhance transparency in 
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governance affecting both public and private actors (e.g. interest groups, parties or 
charities).74 Once exposed to such formal-legal constraints, organizations are incentivized to 
promote transparency above and beyond what is required to enhance their legitimacy. 
Legally requiring parties to implement intra-organizational democracy is likely to invite 
similar responses.75 
Of course, given that the extent to which formal-legal regulation targets intra-
organizational governance is by no means uniform across advanced democracies,76 the co-
existence of uniformity and diversity in party organization77 is likely to be a lasting feature. 
Nevertheless, voluntary convergence suggests an assimilation between parties78 above and 
beyond what is legally required once regulation in put into place, shifting the balance 
towards uniformity. This is all the more the case as cross-national studies on the legal 
regulation of party governance indicate that regulations adopted across different countries 
– inspired by the ‘mass party model’ – tend to resemble each other suggesting incentives 
towards uniformity not only within but also across legal systems.79 To the extent that 
organizations identify with norms embedded in their socio-legal environment, whether in 
line with internally held beliefs or not,80 this unintentionally reduces freedom of association 
manifest in citizens’ ability to build and maintain organizations in line with their own 
beliefs.81 On normative grounds the equal treatment of organizational members in conflict 
situations (or organizational compliance with democratic principles more generally) seems 
difficult to reject. However, if organizations mobilizing citizens ought to reflect diversity and 
pluralism to do justice to a diverse society (that inevitably encompasses citizens holding 
authoritarian rather than democratic values), the voluntary convergence suggested by our 
findings might be less of a blessing.82 This is particularly problematic as party regulation – as 




To which extent legal attempts to support the implementation of norms underpinning 
liberal democracy within voluntary organizations such as parties might - paradoxically – 
constrain pluralism is an important area for furture research. We need to examine the 
juridification of party rules in other areas of party governance, not only looking at the 
internal procedures parties adopt voluntarily or in response to legal constraints, as done in 
this study, but also consider possible and actual responses of the state authorities to party 
non-compliance when facing legal constraints. Also, to broaden support for our hypotheses, 
we need to assess the juridification of parties in a wider range of legal settings than those 
studied here, which would enable us to qualify some counterintuitive findings. For instance, 
the Norwegian Progress Party adopted elaborate conflict regulation procedures to assure its 
own functioning, against its own ideological dispositions and in a legally permissive 
environment. A broader application can settle whether the Progress Party is an outlier 
suggesting that most parties (if not exposed to formal-legal constraints) adopt internal rules 
reflecting their beliefs even in face of intense conflict or whether this case points to 
alternative conditions for high juridification in unregulated settings that should be theorized 
alongside ideology.  
Meanwhile, a longitudinal analysis of party law change and its implications for the 
nature of party conflict regulation could grant more nuanced insights in a possible inter-
connection between coercive and voluntary convergence. Voluntary convergence – visible 
in an over-fulfilment of legal obligations – assumes party laws to be an established part of 
the political system’s socio-legal environment (which presupposes rules to be stable and 
accepted for a certain period). Relaxing this condition in a longitudinal design, we could 
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examine whether parties confronted with a new law at first adopt to it only minimally 
(reflecting a coercive patterns), and move towards a voluntary pattern only later. 
Finally, the last avenue for future research is the most encompassing and concerns 
the study of juridification of rules also within other types of membership organizations such 
as interest groups or public benefit organizations, which in many democracies are also 
increasingly exposed to legal constraints.84 While ideological differences – theorized in 
Hypothesis 1 - are likely to matter less for organizations that present themselves as bi-
partisan to maximize their policy influence,85 ideology is an important driver for parties and 
movements alike.86 Meanwhile, there is no reason why our Voluntary Convergence 
Hypothesis should not be applicable to voluntary organizations generally. To examine 
whether voluntary convergence to external legal constraints is a broader phenomenon is an 
important avenue for future research to establish the extent to which the consequences of 
the growing formal-legal regulation of other organizations mobilizing civil society is similarly 
pervasive as those of political parties or whether parties, in charge of running the state, are 
particularly receptive to legal influences. This would contribute to recent endeavours 
towards developing integrated approaches on different types of membership organizations 
including parties and groups87 with the porential to generate broader insights into how the 
law shapes organized civil society, both intentionally and unintentionally.  
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Figure 1: Levels of Party Juridification by Country 
 
Note: Source for left-right positioning Bakker et al 2015; Polk et al 2017; Biorcio 2016; Grant and Tilley 2019; 
for juridification score: own data.  
 
Figure 2: Average Values of Party Juridification Index by Country 
 Note: 
Points represent the average value and lines the standard deviations; Source for juridification scores: own 
data. 
 
Table 1: A Comparison of Parties’ Legal Environments: UK, Norway, Spain and Germany 
 Party law regulating 
organizational 
governance? 
Aspects of intra-party conflict regulation subject to ‘imposed juridification’ 
embedded in party lawi  
UK No n/a 
Norway No n/a 
Spain Yes - Individual members need to be able to complain about rule violations (access) 
(Art.8.2.(d)) 
- An individual member has the right to be informed/heard when subject to 
disciplinary procedures and sanctions need to be justified (Art.8.3) 
- Individual right to appeal disciplinary measures (Art. 8.3) 
Germany Yes - Independent tribunals on different levels must be established § 14 (1-2) 
- Only independent tribunals can expel individuals (§ 10 (4)) 
- All participants must be granted a ‘legal hearing’ and due process § 14 (2) 
- Mechanisms must be in place to counter the bias of a specific tribunal § 14 (2) 
- An independent appeal body must be established ‘on a higher level’ in case of 
expulsions (§ 10 (4)) 
- In the case of removal from party office and expulsion, decisions must be 
justified (§ 10 (3)3.); requirement of written justification in case of individual 
expulsion (§ 10 (5)) 
- Severe violations are the only admissible grounds for expulsions (individuals or 
branches) (§ 16 (1); § 10 (4) 
Note: See for the legal provisions in full, Table A1 in the Online Appendix. 
 
 
                                                             
i Note in Germany and Spain the courts have tended to interpret the party laws in such a way to sustain the 
leeway of parties to organize themselves freely within statutory constraints, which means we do not find an 
expansion of legal requirements through judicial rulings. 
Table 2: Indicators for Measuring Party Juridification 
Indicator of Juridification Component of Rule of Law  Weight 
Binding quality of conflict regulation rules 
(predictability of conflict regulation rules) 
Laws limit decision-makers; accountability of 
ruling elite (Component  1), the laws are clear, 





Remit of procedures not only focused on 
disciplinary purpose but regulating any kind of 
non-compliance with party rules (by members or 
elites) 
Limitations on decision-makers; accountability of 
ruling elite (Component 1), laws protect 





Independence of decision-making body (required, 
not optional)  















Procedures to protect against bias (e.g. right to 
request replacement of individual tribunal 
members) 











Right of those involved to be heard prior to 
decision  





Decisions have to be made by decision-making 
body in a predefined time frame  
Law enforcement is efficient (Component  4) Essential for efficient 
enforcement0.5  
Decisions have to be justified in writing Law enforcement is efficient 
(Component 4) 












Table A1. Articles in party laws relevant to juridification (in English) 
 
Germany 1967 Party Law 
Art.10 
(3) The statutes shall contain provisions governing the following: 
1. admissible disciplinary measures against members;  
2. reasons for imposing such measures;  
3. bodies within the party which may impose disciplinary measures. If any member is 
discharged of party offices or deprived of qualification to hold them, such decision must be 
justified. 
(4). A member may only be expelled from a party if he or she deliberately infringes the 
Statutes or acts in a manner contrary to the principles or internal rules of the party and thus 
seriously impairs its standing. 
(5). The resolution on the expulsion shall be taken by the competent arbitration court in 
accordance with the arbitration rules. The right to appeal to a higher arbitration court shall 
be guaranteed. Decisions shall be justified in writing. In urgent and serious cases requiring 
immediate interference, the executive body of the party or a local organization may exclude 
a member from exercising his/her rights until such time as the arbitration court has reached 
a decision. 
Art. 14 
(1) The party and the highest-level local organizations set up courts of arbitration to settle 
and decide on disputes between the party or a local organization and individual members as 
well as disputes on the interpretation and implementation of the statutes. Joint courts of 
arbitration may be set up to serve a number of local organizations at district level. 
 (2) The members of such courts of arbitration shall be elected for a maximum period of four 
years. They may not be members of the executive body of the party or a local organization 
or be in the employment of the party or a local organization or receive regular emoluments 
from them. They shall be independent and not bound by any instructions. 
Art 16 
(1) The dissolution and exclusion of subordinate local organizations as well as the 
termination of whole bodies of local organization shall be permissible only in cases of 
serious infringement of party principles or rules. The Statutes shall stipulate: 
2 
 
1. the reasons justifying the measures and  
2. which higher-level local organization and which local organization body may adopt such 
measures.  
(2) In order to implement a measure pursuant to para. 1, the executive body of the party or 
a higher-level local organization shall receive confirmation from a more senior body. The 
measure shall become invalid if it is not confirmed at the next party assembly. 
Spain 2002 Party law 
Art. 8 
2. The statutes will have a detailed list of the rights of members, including, in any event, the 
following: 
d) To challenge agreements adopted by the management bodies which are considered an 
infringement of the Law or the statutes.  
3. Expulsion from the party and other sanction measures which deprive members of their 
rights may only be imposed through proceedings where both parties are present. The 
members affected must be guaranteed the right to be informed on the events giving rise to 
the measures, the right to be heard prior to adopting the measures, the right to a justified 
reason for the agreement to impose a sanction, and the right to file, as the case may be, an 
internal appeal. 







Table A2. List of parties and national party statutes/constitutions/regulations 
 
Country Party Name Statutes/Constitutions/Regulations 
Germany 
Linke (Left) Federal Statutes 2015 
Grüne (Greens) Party Rules 2015 
FDP (Liberals) Federal Statutes 2016 
AfD (Alternative for 
Germany) 
Federal Statutes 2015 
Spain 
EQUO (Greens) Party Statutes II Federal Assembly 2014 
Podemos (United we 
can) 
Party Statutes 2014 
Democratic Guarantees Commission Regulation 
2014 
IU (United Left) Party Statutes XI Federal Assembly 2016 
PSOE (Spanish Socialist 
Workers' Party) 
Party Statutes 38 Conference 2012  
Guarantees Commission Regulation 2012 
Party Members Regulation 2012 
UPyD (Union, Progress 
and Democracy) 
Party Statutes II Conference 2013 
Ciudadanos (Party of 
the Citizenry) 
Party Statutes III Assembly 2013 
United 
Kingdom 
Green Party Party Constitution Spring Conference 2012 
Liberal Democrats Party Constitution 2016 
Labour Party Party Rule Book 2016 
Conservatives Party Constitution 2009 




Socialist Left Party Statutes 2015 
Greens Party Statutes 2016 
Labour Party Party Statutes 2015 
Centre Party Party Statutes 2015 Ethical guidelines 2015 
Liberal Party Party Statutes 2015 
Christian Democrats Party Statues 2015 
Conservative Party Party Statutes 2013 






Table A3. Indicators for measuring party juridification 
Indicator of Juridification Component of Rule of Law  Weight 
Binding quality of conflict regulation rules 
(predictability of conflict regulation rules)1 
Laws limit decision-makers; accountability of 
ruling elite (Component  1), the laws are clear, 





Remit of procedures not only focused on 
disciplinary purpose but regulating any kind of 
non-compliance with party rules (by members or 
elites)2 
Limitations on decision-makers; accountability of 
ruling elite (Component 1), laws protect 





Independence of decision-making body (required, 
not optional)  















Procedures to protect against bias (e.g. right to 
request replacement of individual tribunal 
members) 










Right of those involved to be heard prior to 
decision  





Decisions have to be made by decision-making 
body in a predefined time frame  
Law enforcement is efficient (Component  4) Essential for efficient 
enforcement0.5  
Decisions have to be justified in writing6 Law enforcement is efficient 
(Component 4) 
Essential for efficient 
enforcement0.5 
Note: Most codes are based on dummy variables (0 = absence of mechanism; 1 = presence), if categorical variables were 
used, they are specified in footnotes. 
 
  
                                                             
1 For instance, rules do not contain the possibility that the leadership can ad hoc change and create new rules 
concerning conflict regulation. 
2 Coding categories: conflict regulation regime covers only disciplinary purpose (0); covers any kind of non-
compliance with party rules including those by power holders (1). 
3 Coding categories are: this right exists for all sanctions (1), for some sanctions (0.5), for none (0). 
4 Coding categories: none (0), yes but not independent (0.5), yes and independent (1). 
5 This is important as procedures cannot only be accessed by leaders to sanction members/units but are also 
accessible to members who can complain about rule violations generally (be it by organs, other rank-and-file 
or holders of status functions). Coding categories: individual members have access (1), quorums of members 
and/ or organs other than leadership have access (0.5), only national leadership has access (0). 
6 Considered given if this holds for some decisions at least. 
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Table A4. Coding examples 
 
Indicators of Juridification Example7  
No binding quality of conflict 
regulation rules (no 
predictability of conflict 
regulation rules) 
The Discipline Committee of the NEC shall have 
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to Party Discipline. 
The NEC may from time to time as it deems appropriate 
make Rules for the composition of discipline panels and 
management of matters of discipline and appeals, for the 
conduct of hearings and appeals under Article 11 and for 
the procedure and evidence to be used by the Committee.  
(Art. 11.1, United Kingdom Independence Party, Party 
Constitution, 2012, UK).8 
Remit of procedures not only 
focused on disciplinary 
purpose but regulating any 
kind of non-compliance with 
party rules (by members or 
elites)  
The Guarantees Committee may declare any internal 
election invalid, at the request of a party, when there is 
evidence of significant irregularities and order its 
repetition.9 (Art.3.15.5. Ciudadanos, Party Statutes, 2012, 
Spain). 
(On party member rights) To submit requests and 
proposals to the governing bodies of the Party, to seek 
information from them and to appeal to the Guarantees 
Committee if they feel their rights as members have been 
violated by an organ of the Party. They are also entitled 
to seek protection before the same Committee by the 
agreements of the organs of the party they consider 
contrary to the law or the statutes10. (Art.2.3.6. 
Ciudadanos, Party Statutes, 2012, Spain) 
Independence of decision-
making body (required, not 
optional)  
The members of party tribunals are independent and not 
bound by any orders (…) The members of party tribunals 
may not be the member of a party executive body, be 
employed by the party or receive a regular income from 
it.  
(§3 (1-2), AfD, Schiedsgerichtsordnung, 01.02.2015, 
Germany).11 
                                                             
7 Examples of German, Norwegian and Spanish regulations are based on own translations (the original text is 
given in footnotes). 
8 Unlike for the other categories, an example is given for the 0 (not the 1) coding as this condition is met 
except qualifications are made as illustrated by the example. 
9 Art. 3.15.5. La Comisión de Garantías podrá declarar inválida cualquier elección interna, a instancia de parte, 
cuando exista evidencia de irregularidades importantes y ordenar su repetición (Ciudadanos, Party Statutes, 
2012).  
10 Art.2.3.6. A presentar peticiones y propuestas ante los órganos directivos del Partido, a recabar información 
de los mismos y a recurrir a la Comisión de Garantías si consideran que sus derechos como afiliados han sido 
vulnerados por algún órgano de dirección del Partido. Tendrán también derecho a solicitar amparo ante la 
misma Comisión por los acuerdos de los órganos del Partido que estimen contrarios a la Ley o a los estatutos 
(Ciudadanos, Party Statutes, 2012). 
11 § 14 (2) Sie [die Mitglieder der Schiedsgerichte] dürfen nicht Mitglied eines Vorstandes der Partei oder eines 
Gebietsverbandes sein, in einem Dienstverhältnis zu der Partei oder einem Gebietsverband stehen oder von 




Right to appeal12 Example of coding category 1: Disciplinary cases shall be 
heard without delay by a small Tribunal of three 
members, with a right of appeal to the next available 
meeting of the Regional Council against the Tribunal's 
decision and recommended action. […]  
(Art. 4.IX. Green Party Statutes, 2012, UK) 
Example of coding category 0.5: Decisions on suspensions 
of public and party elected representatives at regional 
and local level are made by the executive committee 
(national level) with 2/3 majority. Decisions by the 
executive committee can be appealed (in written form) 
within 3 weeks to the country committee. The latter 
organ can decide, with simple majority, to reject the 
appeal or send it back to the executive committee for 
renewed processing (Art.3.4. The Socialist Left, Party 
Statutes, 2015, Norway)13.  
Appeal body (required, not 
optional) 14 
Example of coding category 1: Those concerned are 
authorized within 14 days to appeal against orders and 
decisions of regional party tribunals to the national party 
tribunal15 (§ 21 (2), AfD, Schiedsgerichtsordnung, 
01.02.2015, Germany) 
Example of coding category 0.5: The application for leave 
and the review (if any) will be conducted by a retired 
Judge appointed by the Board (“the Reviewer”) (Art. 84.4 
Conservatives Party Constitution, 2009, UK). 
Procedures to protect against 
bias (e.g. right to request 
replacement of individual 
tribunal members) 
Those who have personal or family-related interests 
(economical, business-like etc.) in a case processed in the 
party organs or in the groups in the local council, regional 
council etc. are to be considered as having a conflict of 
interest, and cannot participate in the consideration of 
the case.16 
(Art. 13.19 The Labour Party, Party Statutes, 2015, 
Norway). 
                                                             
12 Coding categories are: this right exists for all sanctions (1), for some sanctions (0.5), for none (0). 
13 Note that this is the only type of sanction with the right to appeal in The Socialist Left Party in Norway.  
§ 3-4 Vedtak om suspensjon av tillitsvalgt på lokallags- og fylkesnivå fattes av sentralstyret med 2/3 flertall. 
Vedtak i sentralstyret kan innen 3 uker skriftlig ankes inn for landsstyret, som med alminnelig flertall kan vedta 
å avvise anken eller å sende saken tilbake til sentralstyret for ny behandling. (The Socialist Left, Party Statutes, 
2015.) 
14 Coding categories: none (0), yes but not independent (0.5), yes and independent (1). 
15 § 21 (2) Gegen die einstweilige Anordnung und andere Beschlüsse der Landesschiedsgerichte steht den 
Beteiligten die Beschwerde mit einer Frist von 14 Tagen zum Bundesschiedsgericht zu. (AfD, 
Schiedsgerichtsordnung, 01.02.2015) 
16 Art. 13.19. Den som har personlige eller familiære interesser (økonomiske, forretningsmessige mv.) i en sak 
som behandles i partiets organer eller i kommunestyregruppe, fylkestingsgruppe, mv. er å anse som inhabile 
og kan således ikke ta del i behandlingen av saken (The Labour Party, Party Statutes, 2015). 
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Access to use conflict 
resolution procedure17 
Example of coding category 1: All members can send 
complaints to the control committee.18  
(Art. 11.6. The Greens Party Statutes, 2016, Norway) 
Example of coding category 0.5: Any complaint or 
allegation made of breach of the constitution, rules or 
standing orders of the Party shall be made in writing to 
the secretary of the CLP either by a Party branch or by an 
organisation affiliated to that Party, or by a member of 
the CLP[…]. (Chapter 6 Clause II Art.1.A., Labour Party 
Rule Book, 2016, UK) 
Right of those involved to be 
heard prior to decision  
[…] procedures in which the following rights are 
guaranteed to those affected: impartiality, hearing, 
motivation, double instance, presumption of innocence 
and rehabilitation.19 (Art. 11.1. UPyD’s Party Statutes II 
Conference, 2013, Spain) 
Decisions have to be made by 
decision-making body in a 
predefined time frame  
Decision and justification shall be produced in written 
form within a month.20 ((§ 13 (5) Schiedsordnung der 
Partei Die Linke, 2014, Germany) 
Decisions have to be justified 
in writing21 
The Committee of Democratic Guarantees will act ex 
officio or at the request of any registered member or 
party organ through an agile and flexible procedure that 
will always include a written record. 22 (Art. 29. Podemos 
Party Statutes, 2014, Spain) 
 
  
                                                             
17 Coding categories: individual members have access (1), quorums of members and/ or organs other than 
leadership have access (0.5), only national leadership has access (0). 
18 Art. 11.6. Alle partimedlemmer kan sende klager til kontrollkomiteen (The Greens Party Statutes, 2016). 
19 Art. 11.1 […] procedimientos en los que se garantice a los afectados los siguientes derechos: imparcialidad, 
audiencia, motivación, doble instancia, presunción de inocencia y rehabilitación (UPyD ‘s Party Statutes II 
Conference, 2013). 
20 § 13 (5) Beschluss und Begründung sollen innerhalb von einem Monat schriftlich abgefasst werden 
(Schiedsordnung der Partei Die Linke, 2014) 
21 Considered given if this holds for some decisions at least. 
22 Art. 29 La Comisión de Garantías Democráticas actuará de oficio o a petición de cualquier miembro inscrito u 
órgano del partido a través de un procedimiento ágil y flexible del que siempre constará expediente escrito. 
Resolverá de forma motivada y acorde con estos Estatutos, el documento de principios éticos, los reglamentos 
y acuerdos previamente establecidos así como con los principios de democracia, transparencia y demás 
elementos esenciales a Podemos y siempre de acuerdo a los principios generales del derecho. Sus acciones se 
materializarán aceptando, denegando o proponiendo una resolución, según sus competencias, al Consejo de 
Coordinación o a la Asamblea Ciudadana correspondiente (Podemos Party Statutes, 2014). 
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Figure A1 gives an overview of how the indicators spread across the party statutes coded. It 
shows that all indicators are relevant in all countries covered and present in several political 
parties per country, with the exception of Norway, where the independence of the decision-
making body and the need to justify decisions resolving conflicts in writing are not present 
in any of the parties’ statutes. Finally, only in Norway do we have two cases, the Liberal 
Party and the Christian Democrats, with party juridification scores of zero. Both the 
indicators’ relevance across legal settings as well as their diverse usage highlight that they 
capture relevant variation across and within democracies, stressing the wider applicability of 
our coding scheme. What is also interesting to note is the fact that parties in Norway (a civil 
law country) are least inclined to ‘legalize’ their conflict regulation regimes, even less so 
than in the UK, a common law democracy. Consequently, Figure A1 suggests that variation 
between parties operating in different legal environments cannot be reduced to a simple 
civil vs. common law distinction. This differs from previous research suggesting that civil law 
nations – in contrast to common law nations – are prone to strong intra-organizational 

































Table B1. Variation across parties by country 






Left Germany 2007 No 64 No 
Gruene Germany 1980 No 63 Yes 
FDP Germany 1948 No 0 Yes 
AfD Germany 2013 Yes 0 No 
EQUO Spain 2011 Yes 0 No 
Podemos Spain 2014 Yes - No 
IU Spain 1986 No 2 No 
PSOE Spain 1879 No 110 Yes 
UPyD Spain 2007 Yes 5 No 
Ciudadanos Spain 2005 Yes - No 
Greens United 
Kingdom 





1988 No 8 Yes 
Labour United 
Kingdom 
1900 No 232 Yes 
Conservatives United 
Kingdom 
1834 No 198 No 
UKIP United 
Kingdom 
1993 Yes 0 No 
Socialist Left Norway 1975 No 7 Yes 
Greens Norway 1988 Yes 1 No 
Labour Party Norway 1887 No 55 Yes 
Centre Party Norway 1920 No 10 Yes 
Liberal Party Norway 1884 No 9 No 
Christian 
Democrats 
Norway 1933 No 10 No 
Conservative 
Party 
Norway 1884 No 30 Yes 
Progress 
Party 
Norway 1973 No 29 Yes 
Note: The number of seats corresponds to the electoral results at the elections before the party 
statutes analysed were put into place. New parliamentary parties have been represented in national 
parliament less than three terms. National government refers to the participation at the national 
government at any point between the year the party law was passed and the party statutes analysed 
were put into place. 






Table C1. Pre-existing provisions on conflict regulation in the statutes of parties that existed prior to 







The right to challenge a biased court (§9), only a tribunal elected every 
four years can expel a member (rather than the executive) (§8), right to be 
heard prior to decision (§7), justification of decision (§10)  
SPD 
Statutes prescribe formation of tribunals to deal with disciplinary 
mechanisms (§27.4), independent body dealing with complaints about 
executive (§25), justification of decision (§27, 10.)  
Spain PP The right to be heard and the right to appeal to sanctions (Art.11 Party 
Statutes 1990)  
Sources: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, Organisationsstatut 1964; Christdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, Bundesparteigerichtsordnung, 12.18.1951. PP, Estatutos XIII Congreso 1999. 
 
 
Table C2. New provisions ‘raising of the bar’ regarding intra-organizational juridification after the 
introduction of the party laws 
 
Country Party Provisions 
Germany 
CDU 
The party had a tribunal which was regularly elected by a party 
commission, but the chairman of tribunals was still part of the executive 
(§1), hence the tribunal was not independent. The CDU statute prior to 
the party law did not grant a right to appeal for decisions of the national 
court (§10).  
SPD 
The party had tribunals to handle disciplinary measures prior to 1967, but 
these tribunals were controlled by the executive ((§27.4), not 
independent. The executive could expel members in serious cases without 
right to appeal (§29.1, 3).  
Spain PP The right to complain about rule violations does not appear in the PP 
statutes prior 2002.  
 
Sources: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, Organisationsstatut 1964; Christdemokratische 




Figure C1. Levels of Party Juridification by Country (including parties drafting party laws) 
 
 
